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1. Introduction: what is fisheries management?
1.1. Through effective regulation, resource management seeks to gain 'optimum'
outputs from the resource base. In a few cases, management may recognise that a
resource is under-utilised and seek to increase output. More normally, however,
management recognises that many resources are often close to being over-utilised,
and so seeks to limit exploitation.
1.2. Historically, fisheries management has been a 'command and control' system of
resource management, typically based on very centralised systems of regulation
and resource administration in which it is the state which commands sole
responsibility for both monitoring and regulating the resource base. Briefly,
contemporary fisheries management strategies espouse regulations that are, firstly,
biologically-based and seek to protect fish stocks. Regulations will include net
mesh-size controls, bans on fishing in certain areas or during certain times of the
year or prohibiting the use of certain destructive kinds of fishing gear and/or
techniques. The second set of regulations have economic origins and seek to
control effort sizes. These may include fish quotas and licensing or registration
systems that can be used to limit the number of fishing units in a fishery.
1.3. These kinds of regulatory systems have many problems. For our purposes, three
main problems may be identified:
1.3.1. they are expensive: the costs of monitoring a fishery for fish population
dynamics and/or whether or not fishermen are breaking rules are prohibitive
if such regulation is to be carried out by a single, central regulatory
institution alone.
1.3.2. they assume that the state is the sole source of regulation. This degree of
centralisation is inefficient if the state is under-staffed, lacking in
technology, under-funded and under-motivated.
1.3.3. the rules assume homogenous fishing communities and homogenous
applicability. The rules assume that all resource users will equally be able to
obey the rules, and that the outcome of these regulations will be uniform
irrespective of culture, location, history nor political systems. They cannot,
in other words, capture human diversity and are too inflexible to cope with
dynamic systems of resource use.
1.4. Considering alternative systems of resource management has many advantages.
One of the foremost alternative suggestions for fisheries management is the
inclusion of fishing communities in the regulation and monitoring of the resource.
Here are some of the advantages:
1.4.1. the costs of implementation, monitoring and enforcement are transferred
from any outside institution to the community itself. Given that many
external enforcement agencies in 'developing' nations are often unable to
afford these costs, this factor is quite possibly the most important of the
benefits to be derived from such a transfer
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1.4.2. Because resource-using communities have a greater vested interest in the
sustainability of their resources, the implementation of such regulatory
systems can lead to the more effective monitoring of the resource and the
more efficient punishment ofoffenders.
1.4.3. Because resource-using communities have typically had considerable
historical experience regulating the resources on which they rely, they are
likely to not only perceive the benefits of creating them, but will, in all
likelihood, choose such institutions that they are already familiar with, and
which they can draw from their history. This means that the regulations that
arise are more likely to capture the diversity within and between
communities than any type of externally imposed regulation.
1.4.4. The reasons why people obey or disobey regulations will nearly always
have something to do with the benefits they perceive that they will gain. In
other words, if disobeying a regulation is likely to yield greater benefits that
obeying it, it is unlikely that people will obey the regulation. How benefits
are viewed will vary from community to community, and from culture to
culture. Internally generated community regulations are more likely to
capture these benefits than those regulations imposed from the outside.
1.4.5. Common property resources - in particular fisheries - are often fraught with
problems of uncertainty. Management of any variety typically cannot
account for such uncertainties, particularly because of difficulties in
monitoring resource variations. 1-lowever, because of their intimacy with the
resource base, communities are better able to assess variations w'ithìn the
resource as they occur, and able to react to these more rapidly than any
external institution overly-reliant on scientific assessment of resource
change.
1.5. It is these and other factors that this paper will discuss. Its objective will be to
attempt a change in how we view the resource. All too often, resource users are
branded as 'ignorant' or 'uneducated' or even as 'criminals', when the reasons for
over-exploitation or regulatory disobedience may in fact be very easily explained if
we took the time to look a little further or to understand the effects of wider social,
political and economic trends.
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2.Wy,obeyregatios?
2.1. Imagine a water tap. When turned all the way down, no water comes out of it,
while lots of water comes out of it when it is turned ail the way up. The amount of
water coming out of the tap is regulated by how far we have turned it. Rules, on the
other hand, are far more final. They would only allow lots of water or no water to
come out of the tap. They allow for no amount in between these two extremes.
Realistically, regulation can rarely achieve ultimate outcomes, but can often
achieve a degree of the desired outcome of some action. As a result, resource users
may not obey or disobey rules, but instead obey or disobey to a certain degree. The
degree to which they choose either outcome is dependent on the benefils they
perceive from doing so. Take a look at this example:
200 years ago, fishermen using hooks and lines were catching between 100,000 and
200,000 tons of cod a year from the Newfoundland fishery in Canada. In the 1870's,
the cod trap was invented and soon introduced to the fishery. Catches rose to a fairly
stable 200,000 tons of fish a year. Catches were fairly seasonal, and fishermen would
have to wait for annual runs of fish called 'capelin' which the cod followed into the
bay. In the 1960's, as demand for cod in Europe increased, distant water fleets
arrived, and catches rose suddenly to 800,000 tons a year. Canada rapidly introduced
a 200 mile economic exclusion zone, and started urging its own fishermen into the
water, subsidising boat building, supporting the formation of large trawler fleets and
building fish processing plants. New fishing technologies enabled trawler captains to
locate areas where the cod mated and bred, so turning the fishery from a seasonal one
to a year-round activity. The Canadian government was supposed to regulate fishing.
However, trawler boat captains rarely took any notice, fishing wherever they liked
and catching as much as they liked. In the fever of the boom years, no one paid
attention to the rules. And then, in 1992, Newfoundland's cod fishery collapsed. As
the cod catches declined, trawler boat operators invested in ever more sophisticated
technologies to find what cod remained and so giving an artificial impression of what
was happening. Fishing for cod off Newfoundland is now banned. The fish has not re-
established itself and may not ever do so again (From Bill MeKibben, 1998).
Box i
2.3. In the latter example, the perceived benefit was cash. Cash is very often perceived
as an important benefit in the resource exploitation process, and will almost
certainly always be considered as such.
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?At the turn of the century, many of the problems affecting Kenya's Lake Victoria
fishery arose with the establishment of a cash economy in Kenya. In 1900 and 1910,
hut and pou taxes were introduced so as to try and obtain funds for the colonial
government, as well as to force Kenyans to accept cash as a legitimate medium of
exchange (Fearn 1961). Missionaries had already appeared in the west, where they
persuaded the local population to clothe themselves, and so opened up a market for
clothes (Fearn 1961; Ayot 1979). A governor persuaded Luo communities to build
roads around the Winam Gulf on which they could then ride their newly-purchased
bicycles (Goldsmith 1955). These developments helped to establish cash as a viable
medium of exchange in western Kenya. Markets were a necessary accompaniment to
this process. Demand for fish grew primarily amongst European consumers located in
Nakuru, Naivasha and Nairobi. The most popular fish was tilapia, and in 1933
100,000 fish were sent down the railway line (Beverton 1959), increasing to
2,400,000 fish in 1953 (Beverton 1959). This rising production was facilitated by the
introduction of nylon gill-nets, for which demand was so high a black market in the
nets had developed by the 1930's (Feam 1961) and by 1953 an estimated 2,000 km of
nets were being set per night (Fryer and lles 1972). But why did cash achieve such
rapid popularity? Kenya's Lake Victoria fishermen are predominantly of L.uo origin.
For them, cattle was the highest form of wealth. Traditionally, access to cattle was
mainly through inheritance. Cash changed this, for it became an acceptable medium
of exchange for the purchase of cattle. As one fisherman put it "the new [fishi market
gave people new opportunities for wealth. With money, we could buy more livestock
and land, and the more cattle and land we had, the more say we had in the
community..money made the drive for power easier" (quoted in Geheb 1997: 62).
13ox2
2.4. Instead of working to conserve fisheries, management may try to develop it. It may
try to regulate a fishery in such a way as to maximise its profits, which are then
ploughed back into the fishery. To Western developers these sorts of ideas may
seem both plausible and rational but may not do so to resource exploiters:
In 1976 a Swedish SIDA mission in Guinea-Bissau sought to develop a fishery to be
exploited by Bijagos, a peoples living on the Bijagos Archipelago, sorne 60 km off
the Guinea-Bissau shore. The Swedes anticipated providing initial financial and
technical inputs, followed by a small-scale fishery developing, profits, reinvestment
into the fishery and so on. The Bijagos, however, saw little reason to harvest
resources over and above their needs, because current production levels provided as
many benefits as required. The Swedes also felt that an exchange economy
supported by rice might be of benefit to the islanders, and attempted to establish a
system whereby fish would be exchanged for rice in an effort to 'force' the Bijagos
to fish. This too failed, and the final recommendation of the Swedes was that "...the
condition for the development of the fisheries in the Bijagos society is a
'destruction' of the social and economic organization of the same society and its
cultural institutions" (Baekgaard and Overballe, 1992).
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Box 3
2.5. Benefits, therefore, may be different to different groups of people. We may even
find that how benefits are perceived can also change over time. Hence, a Canadian
fisherman may initially have thought several thousand dollars to be a benefit at the
start of the 'boom' described in Box i above. After the cod collapse, however,
merely finding a job may have been seen to be a great benefit. There are additional
factors that can influence how people perceive benefits and what determines
whether or not they obey rules, and these may have a great deal to do with access.
3. What's access?
3.1. Imagine a door. The degree to which it is open represents the degree to which you
have access to the goods on the other side. Access to something is normally a matter
of degrees. Thus, for example, a fisherman with a 6" net has access to those fish of
6" girth and above, but not to those below. This is not to say he has no access to
fish, but that he has a degree of access to fish Similarly, a poor fisherman with a
single net has less access to fish than a wealthy fisherman with 150 nets. The factors
that determine access to resources are many One of these is vulnerability.
3.2. People with plenty of access to resources (or the ability to buy them) are not
vulnerable. When resources are few, they can switch between resources or diversify.
Impoverished, resource constrained, people have fewer options. Vulnerability is a
factor of the number of resource options one has, and the fewer resource options
one has, the greater one 's vulnerability.
3.3. Vulnerable resource exploiters may have no recourse but to over-exploit a resource
irrespective of what they may think is right or wrong or, for that matter, what the
rules say. Comparatively speaking, the resource-poor face very risky conditions.
Just a little too much rain may cause far more and far greater problems to the
resource poor than it would to a relatively affluent urban inhabitant. Because the
resource poor cannot switch between resources, and have difficulties diversifying
their nutritional base, their lives may in large measure be defined by attempts to
limit the risks that they perceive. In this context, risk aversion is seen as a benefit.
34. The objective, then, becomes one of trying to avoid these risks by clothing oneself
in securities of one form or another, most often classifiable as 'coping mechanisms'.
Risk aversion, then, is normally a broad-based survival strategy, while coping
mechanisms are the practical tools used to achieve security.
3.5. For example, a fisherman with two wives and seven children to feed, faces the
knowledge that he is unable to feed them all with his limited access to land. He has
no cattle, and his agricultural activities are severely limited by climatic constraints.
He therefore needs cash in order to purchase the food with which to feed his family.
Competition on the lake is stiff, which increases the level of uncertainty that he
faces. His coping mechanisms will, therefore, aim to limit the degree to which he is
affected by this uncertainty. Hence, he invests in a very small meshed net. Although
it is not a complete guarantee of successful catches, it is a better guarantee against a
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zero catch than if he were to use a larger mesh-size. He will also have improved the
degree of access he has to the resource.
3.6. This is a coping mechanism, which forms a part of a wider strategy aimed at
reducing the risks he faces not only in the fishery, but in farming, or in the economy
as a whole. An additional (and common) response within this strategy is to stop
planning for the long-term. The resource rich can plan well into the fttture, because
they have the resources at present with which to do so. However, the resource poor
typically have too few resources at present and therefore no ability to consider the
long- term
3,7. It is these kinds of factors that will determine how individuals perceive benefits and
make decisions over whether or not they should obey rules. For the resource poor
fisherman described above, pleas to avoid catching under-sized fish from the
Fisheries Department are not likely to yield any results. An additional factor which
will affect access to a resource is its property status.
4. Property? Whose property?
4.1. Property is that which is owned. To most of us, property constitutes private
property. However, within resource management, there are several types of
property:
Private a resource owned by a single individual or corporation which has
property: total control over who has access to it.
State a resource owned by the state which determines who may have
property: access to it.
Open-access a resource for which there is no ownership claim. Lack of ownership
resources is signified by 'free-for-all' exploitation carried out with no
consideration for the sustainability of the resource. Truly open-
access property is rare because there is very little exploitation that is
not, in some way, regulated. Open-access resources will normally
collapse.
Common these are characterised by, firstly, the difficulties of 'packaging' the
property resource. i.e. it is difficult to fence off the resource to protect it from
resources would-be exploiters. Secondly, it is a 'subtractable' resource in that
whatever one leaves behind will only be taken by someone else.
Because of these two characteristics, the best way of managing such
a resource is to ensure that it is managed my those who exploit it,
and what each exploiter has in common with other exploiters is the
resource itself.
(Adapted from Berkes and Taghi Farvar 1989).
Box 4
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4.2. It is commonly believed that open-access property is synonymous with common
property. This is not the case, and the distinction made above must be maintained.
4.3. Fisheries are one of the best examples of a Common Property Resource (CPR).
Those fisheries that fall under the contemporary forms of fisheries management
mentioned earlier are nearly always managed as state property. Under this system, it
is the state who is responsible for determining not only who may exploit the
resource, but also to ensurethat only those who are qualified to exploit the resource
may do so. This is not to say that other forms of property-related fisheries
management do not exist.
4.4. In fisheries, the closest thing to private 'property' that we may find are Territorial
Users Rights in Fisheries (TURFS). Here, a community (usually) will claim an area
of water as their wn, and normally manage it as a shared resource. What is of
interest to fisheries managers is that the community will protect this resource by
excluding outsiders from exploiting it. Thus, the fish caught are not owned by the
community, but rather, the water in which they swim. In the examples that follow,
you are provided with, firstly, a lake example of TURFs in operation, and secondly,
with two riverine examples:
Lake Titicata is an 8,100 km2 lake lying across the Peruvian-Bolivian border in South
America. Most fishing is carried out with gill-nets and some two-thirds of the catch is
sold for cash, a sixth used for barter and the remainder used for subsistence. In the early
1980's there were 151 communities along the Peruvian shore of the lake, and each one
of these had a 'parcel' of water that it claimed as its own; All members of each
community were allowed to fish in that particular 'parcel'. The inner edge of the parcel
is formed by the shore-line; the sides of the parcel are defined by neighbouring parcels,
while the outer edge is defined by beds of reeds that extend into the lake and which are
also an important resource to the conimunities. On the whole, each territory tends to be
fairly small, and is, as a result, fairly easy to defend, in addition, communities tend not
to comprise more than 20 inhabitants, so that each inhabitant knows all the others. This
latter point is important because much CPR literature suggests that the greater the
number of people who have access to the resource, the more open-access conditions are
likely to arise. Members of neighbouring communities are not tolerated within
communal territory and those wishing access need to offer some form of payment as
well as to have a reason - such as visiting a relative - if they are to enter into a
neighbouring water territory. The water beyond the territory on the open lake is open
and anyone from any community can fish it (Levieil and Orlove 1990)
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The River Niger traverses the Republic of Niger completely. Traditionally, access to
the river has been regulated by the Sorko peoples whose origins lie in the eastern bend
of the river. Between 1983 and 1987 an FAO project sought to re-establish the
territorial rights of the Sorko as a means to managing the river which was, increasingly,
showing signs of over-fishing. The main regulatory focus of the project were the
'gurnu', religious spots along the river where the river Gods lived, and from where
fishing was banned. 11 of these spots were identified along the course of the river and
subjected to the management objectives of the project (Price 1995).
On the flood plain where the River Hadejia meets the River Jama'are in Nigeria, a
rather more elaborate system of TURFs are in use. When the river is in flood it is more
or less open to anyone to fish more or less as they like. However, because most people
are working on their farms at this time of the year, fishing is to some extent regulated.
When the river recedes, it leaves behind pools of water called Jrdarna', which are
owned by the community nearest it. Access to fadama are entirely rguiated by these
communities, from whom permission must be sought before one can fish in it. Each
fisherman must pay a third of his catch to the 'lawan', the village headman who then
distributes the catch amongst the village elderly, or sells it and puts the money into a
village fund. Fadama are also seasonally regulated, with evidence existing of
community-enforced closures of the lakes for much of the time that the river is in
recession (Thomas 1996).
Box 5
4.5. There is very little information on whether or not similar TURF systems existed in
Lake Victoria. Here, however, are some examples gathered from Kenya (Geheb 1997):
Prior to the arrival of the British colonial administration, Kenya's Lake Victoria fishery
was dominated by fishing 'sub-clans'. In this period, Luos could own land, and those
who had land along the shore also 'owned' the water immediately off it. The TURF
was referred to as 'podho,' a term normally applied to owned land. The purpose of this
ownership was to reserve an area for the owner to set his kira traps. As a result, the
water was bounded to either side by neighbouring TURFs, and on the outside by a
contour, being the deepest point at which a kira could be set.
Box 6
4.6. What is clear in all of the above examples is that it is not the government, but the
community that is seen as the highest source of managerial order, including the Box
6 example where water resources are seen as part of a wider, community
sanctioned, systems of territorial rights. Such water rights were facilitated by the
fact that kira traps required only a single operator. However, in the event that a gear
required several operatives, then there was a need for some kind of communal
understanding of how water resources were to be used:
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On Kenyan rivers in the pre-colonial period, a stockade trap called a Vcek' was
employed. It comprised a series of sturdy poles driven into the bed mud of the river to
form a lattice into which ohunga basket traps could be set, facing in the direction that
fish were known to be migrating. Rivers often marked the line between clans. As a
result, a kek could only be built with the consent of the clan on the opposite shore. Once
such consent was obtained, then the clan on the one shore would construct the lattice
out to the median point of the river, and the clan on the opposite shore would complete
the task. Each ohunga trap was owned by an individual who operated it (information
from Cadwalldr 1965; F'eam 1961; van Someren 1959; Whitehead 1956, 1959)
Box 7
4.8.
5. What are institutions?
These patterns of ownership are extremely important and offer management a
potential option to consider in the formulation of managerial policy. In the kek
fishery of Western Kenya, then, some kind of collective decision-making was
important. The results that arise from these kinds of decisions may often endure for
long periods of time and may even come to comprise part of a society' s structure, its
understanding of what is right and wrong, its culture etc. It can be seen, therefore, as
an institution.
5.1. Institutions may be defmed as regular patterns of behavior between individuals and
groups in society, or groupings of things which can be considered as 'normal', rules
and behaviors that serve, or can be used to serve, a collective purpose (Mearns,
1995; Leach et al. 1997). What should be noted, here, is that an institution is not
solely an arrangement formalised by the state, such as a fisheries research institute.
It is any association aimed towards a collective end. The end to which we are most
interested here is the collective management of a fishery.
5.2. In the examples given above from the Kenyan and other fisheries, it was TURFs
that represented part of an institution. It must be understood that it probably only
formed a part of some wider institution. For example, the case from Niger of areas
closed to fishing because these were where the river Gods lived, indicates that this
particular fisheries regulation comprised part of a set of religious institutions. The
Kenyan example of TURFs comprised part of Luo society's understanding of land
ownership.
5.3. Institutions arise out of different cultures and may be constructed to achieve many
ends, of which fisheries regulation may be just one, Indeed, regulation of the fishery
may be a merely incidental outcome of some broader institutional objective. Why
institutions occur is not clearly understood, but Wilson (1982) argues that local
institutions will form when people in a community encounter a problem which is
mutually shared. The problem (or 'dilemma' as he calls it) will result in an
institution provided three conditions exist:
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Box 8
5.4. An example of a repeatedly encountered dilemma could be one in which all
fishermen from a single beach acknowledge that competing with outsiders is having
an adverse affect on their own catches, They may therefore decide to try and limit
access to their fishing grounds by, for example, imposing beach landing fees. Or
they may decide that competition has become so severe that they do not want
outsiders fishing in their waters at all. Or they may decide to limit the people fishing
from their landing to only those that they themselves appoint.
5.5. These fishennen may arrive at the decision to carry out these regulations through
talk at the end of the day while they sit and repair their nets. Because their
community is fairly small, they know who is who and certainly know if outsiders
are fishing their waters. As a result of their discussions, the fishermen decide that
they all stand to benefit from a collective arrangement in which they ensure that
each one of them will look out for outsiders, report it to the others, and then the
whole group of them will seek to expel the outsiders.
5.6. So far, I have argued strongly in favour of community involvement in a fishery.
What, then, is co-management?
6. What is co-management?
6.1. Co-management is system that employs two or more groups of stake holders in the
management of a resource base, and in which all stake holders have equal power to
make decisions. On Lake Victoria, one would anticipate that the stakeholders
involved would be fishing communities and their constituent parts (fishers, fish
traders, fish processors etc.), large-scale industrial fish processing factories and
Fisheries Departments. In the discussion above I have more or less suggested that
fishing communities ought to be able to carry out the task of managing a fisheries
resource by themselves. What role should there then be for fisheries departments?
that the dilemma is encountered repeatedly under more or less similar
circumstances which individualistic opportunistic behavior is seen to destroy
the possibilities for collective gain (i.e. it must be seen that the benefits to be
gained from acting alone will be less than the benefits to be gained from
acting together).
an information network - arising from trading, competition and other
interactions - exists which can form the basis for identifying and negotiating
possible rules.
there exists a collective basis for the enforcement of these rules (i.e. the rules
must not only be designed in such a way that they can be enforced collectively,
but also that there is a collective available to do the enforcing).
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7. What role can Fisheries Departments play?
7.1. 'Adaptive management' is an innovative and fairly recent suggestion for future
(external) resource management in-puts. What its advocates argue is that
management should be designed in such a way that it deliberately changes itself
through a process of experimentation. Management must open itself to the
challenges of the resource system, and be both willing and capable of learning from
this type of experimentation. In doing so, management aims to alter itself to meet
certain managerial challenges typically arising as a result of managing the human
benefactors of a resource base. Adaptive management is related to three key issues:
Box 9
7.2. The resource 'system' mentioned in Box 9 is not an ecosystem, but a resource
characterised by the way in which it is exploited. In adaptive management, the
following is suggested:
1. The extent to which management actions are reversible.
Whether or not the resource system can be understood by experimentation over
small areas in little time.
Whether or not the rate of learning about the resource system is rapid enough to
provide useful information about what decisions to make next.
(Hilbom, Walters and Ludwig 1995).
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Human motivation and responses ought to be included in the study of a
resource, because it is "[tihe short-sightedness and greed of humans underlie the
difficulties in management of resources...".
Action should be taken before scientific consensus is reached. Waiting for such
consensus is merely a delaying tactic because the kinds questions that resource
managers typically ask of scientists (regarding resource status and potential
yield) cannot be answered with any great degree of accuracy.
Scientists should be relied upon to identify problems but not to remedy them..
Scientific judgement is typically influenced by training and may even be subject
to political pressure. In any case, responses to resource problems should be
sought from many disciplines and not just the sciences.
Because resource management has rarely, in the past, been sustainable, any
reference to 'sustainability' as a policy measure should be treated with
suspicion. Instead, inquiry should focus on how difficulties in past resource
exploitation can be overcome.
Uncertainty should be confronted. Once we are freed from the belief that
science and technology can provide solutions to resource exploitation
problems, appropriate action becomes possible. Effective action can take place
under conditions of uncertainty provided such action takes uncertainty into
account: "Most principles of decision-making under uncertainty are simply
common sense".
We must consider a variety of plausible hypotheses about the world; consider a
variety of possible strategies; favour actions that are robust to uncertainties;
hedge; favour actions that are informative; probe and experiment; monitor
results; update assessments and modify policy accordingly; favour actions that
are reversible.
(D. Ludwig, R. Hilbom and C. Walters. 1993 [quotations all from page 36]).
Box 10
7.3. What adaptive management advocates recommend is a system that is freed from the
strictures of scientific methodology because the latter is too time consuming, too
labourious and too expensive. It recommends a system that it able to adapt as
quickly as possible to meet present challenges. You will note a considerable
emphasis on time in boxes 9 and 10. You will also note the emphasis on 'fuzzy'
data - i.e. data which may not be precise, but nonetheless accurate enough to plan
and elicit an appropriate response. You will also note that adaptive management
leans towards the management of people exploiting a resource as opposed to a
managing a resource being exploited by people.
7,4. There is much to suggest that research that relies too heavily on exact data to
provide precision responses is, at best, naive and at worst foolhardy. Chambers
(1992) argues that the quality of data gathered from Ñral populations should be
based on trade-offs between quality, relevance, accuracy and timeliness. These
trade-offs should be based upon the principles of 'optimal ignorance': knowing
what is not worth knowing; and 'appropriate imprecision': not measuring more
precisely than is needed.
7.5. It is along these lines that new objectives for regional Fisheries Departments can be
framed. Their first major step must be to step away from the belief that
contemporary models of fisheries management are an adequate basis for the
management of Lake Victoria' s
fisheries. It is not my objective to suggest that information on fish stocks and effort
size are irrelevant to the management of the fishery, but rather, that they should not
form the core around which all future managerial strategy should be formed.
7.6. The role of the Fisheries Departments can well be altered to be an information
gathering and spreading network. The network will derive information concerning
the fishery from fishing communities. This does not have to be information so
precise that s.ientists are impressed, but nor need it be so imprecise that it cannot
prompt action. At district, regional and national Fisheries Headquarters, the
information is analysed, discussed, and possible actions decided upon, which are
then, through the same network, disseminated to fishing communities. Ensuring that
fishing communities are advised of trends elsewhere on the lake is extremely
important. The state must also be seen to be playing a role in counseling fishing
communities with advice on certain issues, but this must be demand driven - i.e.
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information that fishing communities say they want as opposed to information that
the Fisheries Department feel they need to know.
7.7. Perhaps the biggest change in a community-based management network is the
transfer of the powers of rule enforcement away from the state and into the hands of
the community. Most communities will have systems of justice in which they can
find offenders guilty or not guilty, and in which they can decide on punishments.
However, it is clear that these systems will only be able to cope with certain degrees
of rule breaking. If offenders should disobey to such an extent that, for example, a
prison term is considered, then the fishing communities can call upon the Fisheries
Departments to take over the case at their request.
7.8. The above suggested roles for regional Fisheries Departments are not unusual -
fisheries departments the world over face these kinds of issues. Nor are they
supposed to point the direction towards some kind of concrete policy prescription. If
there is one major implication to be derived from the adaptive management
discussion, it is that management should be flexible and adaptive. Outside of this
broad recommendation, the above ideas are meant only as points of departure for
future discussion.
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